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In Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality1 [hereinafter
cited as Law and Reality], we examined the desirability of continued Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulation of pre-election
campaigning. Our central finding, based upon a study of thirty-one elec-
tions and interviews with over a thousand employees, was that unlawful
campaigning has no greater effect on employee voting behavior in union
representation elections than does lawful campaigning. Hence, we rec-
ommended that the Board should no longer attempt to distinguish be-
tween lawful and unlawful campaigning; that the results of an election,
once conducted, should be final; that speech should be wholly free; and
that the Board should neither set aside elections nor find unfair labor
practices based on oral or written communications by an employer or a
union.
2
Another key finding was that an employer who uses working time or
premises to campaign against unionization, as many do, communicates
with a substantially greater proportion of the employees than does the
union, which is normally unable to campaign on working time or prem-
ises.3 Accordingly, we recommended that whenever an employer cam-
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*** Professor of Organization Behavior, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern
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The comments of Professor Bernard Meltzer of the University of Chicago Law School were, as
usual, invaluable.
1 J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECrIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND REALITY].
2 Id. at 139-53.
3 In NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357 (1958), the Supreme Court
held that an employer did not violate the NLRA by campaigning against union representation on
working time or premises, while preventing similar campaigning on behalf of the union, unless the
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paigns against union representation on working time or premises, it
should be required to allow the union (or unions) the opportunity to do
so.4 Finally, we recommended the use of quicker and more effective rem-
edies than are presently available when an employer engages in retalia-
tory actions against union supporters, particularly during a union
organizing campaign. 5 In sum, it is our view that the basic NLRA goal of
protecting employee free choice can be furthered most effectively by
abandoning the current scheme of government regulation of pre-election
campaigning, and substituting, in its place, a free marketplace of ideas in
which the government's role is limited to insuring union access to em-
ployees and providing adequate remedies when an employer seeks to
punish union supporters by discharge.
Professor Paul Weiler, in his recent article, Promises to Keep: Secur-
ing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 6 disputes
both our finding that unlawful campaigning has no greater effect on vote
than does lawful campaigning and our recommendation that Board regu-
lation of campaigns be discontinued.7 Focusing on data which indicate
that the number of employer unfair labor practices has increased in re-
cent years, and that the frequency of union victories in representation
elections has decreased, Weiler concludes that "discriminatory dis-
charges and other forms of coercive behavior by American employers
have significantly contributed to the steep decline in union success under
the NLRA." Weiler recommends that legal regulation of pre-election
campaigning continue unabated, and that the effects of such campaigning
be minimized by holding an election immediately upon a union's presen-
tation of enough cards to indicate substantial employee interest.9
Thus, as we enter 1985, the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act, both Weiler and we recommend sig-
nificant amendments in that act to provide greater protection for em-
ployee free choice. We differ, however, on what those amendments
should be. In substantial measure, that difference is a product of our
differing analyses of the data reported in Law and Reality. In this article
we set out Weiler's criticisms of our analyses of those data, as well as a
reanalysis by Professor William Dickens, on which Weiler heavily relies.
employer's campaign created an imbalance in opportunities for organizational communication. The
NLRB has rarely found such an imbalance to exist. See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 19-20,
and cases cited therein; R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 179-94 (1976); R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K.
HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 245-48, 286-90 (1974).
4 LAW AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 156-59.
5 Id. at 155-56.
6 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Weiler, Promises]. See also Weiler, Strik-
ing a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 351 (1984).
7 Professor Weiler does not discuss our equal access recommendation.
8 Weiler, Promises, supra note 6, at 1783.
9 Id. at 1805.
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We show that neither the Weiler criticisms nor the Dickens reanalysis
are sound, and conclude that if employee free choice under the NLRA is
to receive meaningful protection the reforms advocated in Law and Real-
ity must be effectuated.
II. WEILER'S CRITIQUE
Professor Weiler concedes that Law and Reality poses a major chal-
lenge to his conclusion that employer unfair labor practices have inter-
fered with the statutory right of employees to bargain collectively, but he
asserts that there exist two critical flaws in our analysis of the data col-
lected in that study.
The first consists in the study's appraisal of the evidence of the impact of
coercive campaigning by employers. The authors actually found that,
among the surveyed workers who had indicated before the campaign either
that they were undecided or that they favored the union, the percentage of
votes against unionization was somewhat higher after an illegal employer
campaign than after a clean one. The magnitude of this difference, how-
ever, was too small to pass a 99% test of statistical significance in such a
limited sample. Thus, the authors asserted, one could not conclude with
certainty that the observed relation was attributable to anything but chance.
This sort of statistical judgment is hardly sufficient for the making of
legal policy. It may be legitimate for Getman and his coauthors to con-
clude that their own data do not demonstrate with certainty that employer
coercion affects employee voting, but it is entirely unjustified to infer from
that fact alone that the contrary is true. The failure to find a statistically
significant connection between employer intimidation and employee votes
in this limited sample neither proves that there is no such relationship nor
provides a basis on which to argue that we may safely abandon efforts to
protect employee choice. Legal policy must almost invariably be formu-
lated in the absence of absolute certainty about the causes and effects of
social phenomena. Given the inherent plausibility of the notion that em-
ployees will respond to threats to the jobs that are crucial to their lives, and
given that the data in the Getman study indicate that it is more likely than
not that such threats do affect employee votes, it is only prudent to take
steps that will ensure freedom of choice in the workplace.10
Implicit in the foregoing quotation is the suggestion that the absence
of a statistically significant relationship between illegal employer
campaigning and employee vote, which we reported in Law and Reality,
may be due in part to a "limited sample." To be sure, if a sample is quite
small, say fifty or fewer, observed differences must be large before they
will be statistically significant. That is because in a small sample slight
differences may be due to chance. However, our finding that employer
unfair labor practices did not have a significantly greater effect than did
lawful campaigning was based upon sample sizes well in excess of fifty.
The particular analysis to which Weiler refers in the foregoing quotation
10 Id. at 1783-84 (footnotes omitted).
79:721 (1984)
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was based upon data collected regarding 489 employees who were classi-
fied as potential union voters because they had signed a union authoriza-
tion card; 444 employees who had been predicted to vote union based on
their attitudes; 485 employees who stated that their intent was to vote
union; and 63 employees who stated that they were undecided how to
vote." In samples of this size, even comparatively small numerical dif-
ferences tend to have statistical significance. 12 Thus, the absence of a
statistically significant relationship between unlawful campaigning and
vote in our sample is no mere artifact of a limited sample size; it rests
solidly upon the observed behavior of hundreds of potential union voters
in both lawful and unlawful election campaigns.'
3
Also implicit in the quoted language from Weiler's article is the sug-
gestion that our conclusions concerning the effect of unlawful campaign-
ing are based solely on the absence of a statistically significant
relationship between such campaigning and vote. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. In fact, our conclusions and recommendations are
the result of a wide variety of analyses, the combined effect of which is to
demonstrate that unlawful campaigning has no greater effect upon vote
than does lawful campaigning.
For example, employees in each election were asked why they had
voted for or against union representation. Of 452 employees who voted
against unionization, fewer than one percent gave reasons for doing so
that related to unlawful employer campaign tactics; ' 4 those few were
evenly distributed among lawful and unlawful elections.' 5 It is possible
that employees who voted against the union because of fear caused by
unlawful campaign tactics were reluctant to admit this fear either to
themselves or to our interviewers. Yet, if such reluctance exists, it
should not have deterred those employees from projecting their fears
onto other employees and reporting that the latter had voted against the
union because of unlawful campaign tactics. Those who gave reasons
11 LAW AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 114-15, 132, 162, 165. while many of the same employ-
ees were identified as potential union voters by each method, we examined the effect of unlawful
campaigning on each of the four groups separately.
12 In general, as sample size increases, the distribution of a sample statistic around the popula-
tion parameter decreases. The rapidity of this decrease depends upon the particular statistic, but the
distributions of bivariate statistics tend to decrease rather rapidly, and a sample size in excess of 100
is considered to be large. See M. Fisz, PROBABILITY THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
367-68 (1963).
13 Of the 31 elections we studied, the employer was found to have engaged in unlawful
campaigning in 22. In the other 9 elections, all employer campaigning was lawful. LAW AND RE-
ALITY, supra note 1, at 111-13. If unfair labor practices charges were decided by the Board, the
Board's decision was used to determine the legality of the campaign. If no charges were filed, or if
the Board did not rule on those charges, a determination as to whether unfair labor practices had
been committed, and, if so, the appropriate remedy, was made by an experienced NLRB judge,
acting in an unofficial capacity. Id. at 44-45.
14 Id. at 98 (Table 4-14).
15 Id. at 115.
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other than unlawful campaigning for their own vote did not, however,
attribute the antiunion votes of others to unlawful campaign tactics.
16
The conclusion that unlawful campaigning has a greater effect than
lawful campaigning was disproven not only by the direct evidence of em-
ployee voting behavior and the reasons given by employees for that be-
havior, but also by the indirect evidence of employee perceptions.
Employee reports of unlawful employer campaigning were no more fre-
quent in elections in which such campaigning occurred than elections in
which it did not. 7 Furthermore, potential union voters who switched to
vote against the union were no more likely to perceive unlawful
campaigning on the part of the employer than were potential union vot-
ers who remained loyal to the union.18 Altogether, these results suggest
that unlawful campaigning did not significantly affect employee vote.
Professor Weiler asserts that the second flaw in our analysis is that
we focussed on individual voting behavior rather than on election out-
come. 19 We did, however, analyze the relationship between unlawful
campaigning and election outcome, with results that were wholly consis-
tent with our individual voter analysis. Thus, we predicted the outcome
of each election using information available to us prior to the cam-
paign-how employees intended to vote and what their attitudes were
towards unions and their employer. If unlawful campaigning coerces
employees into voting against union representation, a precampaign pre-
diction that the union will win should frequently be wrong when the em-
ployer campaign is unlawful. In fact, there were eight elections in which
the precampaign voting intention of the employees predicted a union vic-
tory. The union won seven of those elections, even though unlawful em-
ployer campaigning took place in four of them. To be sure, one of the
elections marked by unlawful campaigning was lost by the union, but
that single instance hardly demonstrates the impact of unlawful
campaigning. Indeed, the union won one election that we not only pre-
dicted it would lose, but that contained unlawful employer campaign-
ing.20 These data provide additional support for the conclusion that
16 Id. at 116.
17 Id. at 116-20. Employee reports of unlawful employer campaigning were elicited by asking
employees whether the employer had taken or threatened harmful action against union supporters,
and whether the employer had given or promised benefits to employees to get them to vote against
the union. If an employee answered either question affirmatively, that employee was asked what the
employer had said or done. Id. at 182-83. In addition, the answers to all questions were examined to
determine if an employee perceived the employer to have utilized unlawful campaign tactics.
18 Id. at 120-24.
19 Weiler, Promises, supra note 6, at 1784-85.
20 See LAW AND REALTy, supra note 1, at 64, 112-14 (Tables 5-1, 5-2), 213 (Appendix F).
Precampaign intent predicted a union victory in elections 1, 3, 9, 11, 19, 20, 21 and 25. The union
won all of these elections except 25. The union also won election 33, in which precampaign intent
predicted a company victory. Employer unfair labor practices occurred in elections 1, 11, 21, 25 and
33.
79:721 (1984)
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election outcomes are unlikely to be affected by unlawful campaigning.
Other election-level data demonstrate the costs of Board regulation
in terms of its frequent overriding of employee free choice, the very inter-
est on which the proponents of Board regulation rely to support its con-
tinuation. Of the twenty-three elections lost by the union, the Board
found unlawful campaigning to have taken place in thirteen, issuing bar-
gaining orders in seven and rerunning six. Our precampaign analysis of
intent, however, predicted that the union would lose all thirteen of those
elections wholly without regard to the content of the employer cam-
paign.21 Thus, even if Board regulation may have saved the union from a
defeat in one election in which pre-campaign intent forecasted a union
victory, it did so at the cost of rerunning six elections and installing the
union as the bargaining representative of the employees in seven elec-
tions-in all of which a majority of the employees indicated both before
the campaign and at the ballot box that they did not wish union represen-
tation. Weighing the costs of Board regulation in those thirteen elec-
tions-the overriding of employee free choice in seven elections and the
delaying of that free choice in six elections-against the assumed benefit
of protecting employee free choice in one election, it is clear to us that
the costs far exceeded the gains. In sum, Professor Weiler to the con-
trary notwithstanding, Law and Reality does focus on election outcomes,
and that analysis strengthens, rather than weakens, the conclusions we
reached upon our analysis of individual voting behavior.
III. THE DICKENS REANALYSIS
Professor Weiler's attack on the findings reported in Law and Real-
ity rests heavily upon a reanalysis of our data by Professor William Dick-
ens. 22 According to Dickens, his reanalysis shows that a person voting in
an election in which illegal speech or illegal actions occurred is two per-
cent less likely to vote for the union than is a person voting in an election
in which neither of those activities took place. Dickens concedes, how-
ever, that these results are not significant.23 He also concedes that "point
estimates do not tell the whole story. Standard errors give us informa-
tion on how sure we can be of the magnitude of certain effects. The
probability that the effect of illegal speech or of illegal actions is to reduce
the probability of the average person voting union by more than one per-
cent is 57 percent."' 24 Stated otherwise, the likelihood that illegal speech
21 Id.
22 See W. Dickens, Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (Oct. 1980) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) [here-
inafter cited as Dickens thesis]. An edited version has been published as Dickens, The Effects of
Company Campaigns on Certification Elections Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 560 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Dickens, Company Campaigns].
23 Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 90.
24 Id.
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or actions will cause a one percent change in voting behavior is, accord-
ing to Dickens, about fifty-fifty. Furthermore, Dickens admits that "[w]e
cannot be very sure of the magnitude of these effects. They could be quite
large or quite small, and they could even have the opposite sign.'
'25
Professor Dickens next creates an additional category of unlawful
campaigning that he calls "threats or actions against pro-union employ-
ees." This category has no legal significance, however, since the Board
does not, and never has, attempted to distinguish between threats or acts
of reprisal, or promises or grants of benefit, on the basis of whether they
were directed against all employees or solely at pro-union employees.
Furthermore, Dickens excludes from the category of threats or actions
against pro-union employees the unlawful interrogation of employees re-
garding their union activities and the surveillance of employees' union
activities. An implied threat of reprisal for participating in union activi-
ties, however, lies at the heart of Board proscription of both interrogation
and surveillance.2 6 Since that threat will normally be directed against
pro-union employees, it makes little sense to exclude interrogation and
surveillance from the category of threats or actions against pro-union
employees.27 Furthermore, interrogation or surveillance took place in
many more than the five elections that Dickens categorizes as marked by
threats or actions against pro-union employees.2 Hence, one must be
skeptical of any conclusions concerning the effect of conduct character-
ized by Dickens as threats or actions against pro-union employees.
It is, however, only this self-created category of unlawful activity
that Dickens finds to have had a significant effect on vote. Thus, he
states that an employee voting in any of the five elections in which he
found this category of unlawful practice to have occurred was 15 percent
less likely to vote union than an employee in an election in which this
conduct did not occur.2 9 As noted, this is a significant difference, and its
significance is reflected in the tighter confidence interval around the point
estimate. "The probability that the effect of actions or threats against the
union is greater than a one percent reduction in the probability of an
average individual voting union is 98 percent."' 30 Combining the three
25 Dickens, Company Campaigns, supra note 22, at 569-70 (emphasis supplied). For the benefit
of those not familiar with the implications of non-significant statistical results, the meaning of the
last sentence is that, as far as Professor Dickens' analysis shows, illegal speech and action are equally
likely to increase, decrease, or have no effect upon the probability of the average worker's voting
union.
26 See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 9-11 and cases cited therein; R. GORMAN, supra
note 3, at 172-73; R. WILLIAMS, P. JANus & K. HUHN, supra note 3, at 168, 176, 189.
27 For essentially the same reasons, it makes little sense for Dickens to categorize interrogation
as illegal action, rather than illegal speech. See Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 71.
28 LAW AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 112-14 (Interrogation or surveillance occurred in fifteen
elections.).
29 Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 90.
30 id. at 90-91.
79:721 (1984)
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categories of illegal speech, illegal actions, and illegal threats or actions
against pro-union employees, Dickens finds an estimated coefficient value
of -. 177 for the commission of illegal practices, which, he states, roughly
corresponds to a 4 percent decrease in the probability of the average
worker voting union.31 This statistically significant combined effect at
the 1% level is, however, due to the inclusion of Dickens' self-created
category of threats and actions against pro-union employees. Further-
more, Dickens' Table VII.3,32 reproduced below, shows that while there
is a 93 percent probability that all violations, taken together, will reduce
the likelihood of a pro-union vote by more than 1 percent, the probability
of a reduction of more than 5 percent is only 40 percent, or less than 50-
50.
TABLE VII.3
AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF THE AVERAGE CAMPAIGN
Specification: 33 Coefficient Probability that effect is to
(s.e. in paren) reduce likelihood of union vote
N.L.R.B. Remedy
Effect of Violations
Effect of Legal Campaign
Effect of Total Campaign
Specific Violations
Effects of Violations
Effect of Legal Campaign














* = .05 (one tail)
** - .01 (one tail)
- .001 (one tail)
>1% >5% >10% >20%
90% 30% <1% <1%
93% 79% 48% 3%




31 Id. at 92. Dickens is estimating a model to determine how much each of a number of factors,
such as illegal practices, contributes to the prediction of vote. The estimated coefficient value results
from the application of the model to the data.
32 Id. at 99.
33 By "specification," Dickens refers to one of two means by which to measure the effects of
illegal practices. The "N.L.R.B. Remedy" specification seeks to analyze the effect of various factors
in elections in which the NLRB remedy for illegal practices was a bargaining order as compared to
elections in which the remedy was a cease and desist order or a rerun election. The "Specific
Violations" specification seeks to compare elections in which illegal speech, illegal actions, or threats
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In sum, Dickens is able to find an effect of illegal campaigning of
which he is confident only by creating a category of unfair labor practices
that has no independent legal significance-threats or actions against
pro-union employees. The Board, however, does not limit its proscrip-
tions to this type of speech or conduct. To the contrary, the Board will
equally set aside an election or issue a bargaining order in an election
characterized by threats or acts against all employees. Thus, the argu-
ment for continued Board regulation, to the extent that it rests upon this
aspect of Dickens' reanalysis, is that the Board should be free to overturn
all elections characterized by unlawful campaigning because the outcome
of a few might have been affected by employer conduct. Overturning the
results of elections not affected by employer conduct itself interferes with
employee free choice, however. Furthermore, Dickens concedes that
most of the elections which the Board sets aside are characterized by
employer conduct that, as far as he can tell, does not interfere with em-
ployee free choice. Hence, the Dickens reanalysis provides no basis for
retaining the existing scheme of Board regulation.34
Professor Weiler states, relying on Dickens' Table VII.3, that "when
both legal and illegal practices were taken into account, it was more than
of actions against union supporters took place as compared to elections in which none of this
conduct took place. See Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 70-72 (footnote added).
34 Empirical researchers may wish to discount Dickens' results on more technical grounds.
Dickens fails to include any variables dealing with the union campaign in his model. His lengthy
justification of this decision argues that such company campaign decisions as "holding a certain
number of meetings, sending a series of letters to workers' homes, or running a clean or illegal
campaign are made, for the most part, before the campaign begins," Dickens, Company Campaigns,
supra note 22, at 564, and that "the union campaign is endogenous, and the level of union campaign
activity cannot be included in an analysis of the effects of company campaigns without biasing the
results." Id. This assumption is contrary to what we know about union and company campaigning.
It thus violates accepted standards for inclusion of variables in causal models. Standards for includ-
ing variables in causal analysis dictate that relevant causes (e.g., union campaign activities) may be
left out of a causal model when they are either uncorrelated with other relevant causes in the model
(e.g., company campaign activities) or are perfectly correlated with another relevant cause or linear
combination thereof. See L. JAMES, S. MULAIK AND J. BRn rr, CAUSAL ANALYsIs (1982).
To check our assumption, we constructed a disaggregated data file based on the 1068 voters in
the elections we and Dickens studied. This data file contained vote, the company campaign data
used by Dickens (supplied by us), the number of early company meetings and letters, the number of
late company meetings and letters, the percent of workers talked to by superiors, the illegal cam-
paign categories developed by Dickens (illegal speech, illegal activities, threats and acts against
union supporters), bargaining orders and other remedies, the number of early and late union letters
and union meetings and union campaign data (supplied to Dickens but not used by him). The
question from a model specification point of view is whether any of the union campaign variables
correlate significantly with vote and with any of the company campaign variables. They do. Late
union meetings correlate significantly with vote (r=.12; p < .001), and at p < .01 with all the
company campaign activities, and with all the illegal campaign indices except illegal activities.
Since union and company campaign activity are correlated, Dickens has built a bias into all the
coefficients of his results by leaving out indicators of the union campaign. Thus, the coefficients
indicating the effects of the company campaign and of illegal behavior are either overestimates or
underestimates of the true coefficients.
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99 percent certain that the typical employer campaign reduced by at least
5% the probability that the average worker would vote for unionization,
and it was more than 90% certain that the campaign reduced that
probability by at least 10%."35 When Dickens refers to the "legal cam-
paign," however, he does not distinguish legal from illegal campaigning,
that is, those speeches protected by section 8(c) from those violating sec-
tion 8(a)(1). Rather, Dickens categorizes campaign activities in a wholly
different fashion, without regard to their legality or illegality. In this
categorization, the "legal" campaign consists of written communications,
meetings, and supervisors' activities analyzed in terms of when and how
frequently they take place, not in terms of their legality or illegality.
36
This, then, is a measure of the volume of the employer's campaign, not
its legality. Some of the employer's letters and meetings undoubtedly
contained illegal speech, but that fact is irrelevant for purposes of this
measure. Because the two measures are based on different criteria, Dick-
ens' efforts to aggregate them, relied upon by Weiler, are unsound. In
this context, adding the effect of violations and the effect of the legal
campaign is like adding the weight of an object to its height; it produces a
figure, but that figure is meaningless.
It is possible, however, to compare the results obtained by measur-
ing the effect of the employer's campaign in terms of its illegality with the
results obtained by measuring that campaign in terms of its level of activ-
ity without regard to legality. Table VII.3 permits such a comparison,
and the results are intriguing. The probability that the effect of unlawful
campaigning is to reduce the likelihood of a union vote by more than a
specified percentage tails off sharply as one moves away from 1 percent.
The likelihood of greater than a 5 percent reduction as a result of unlaw-
ful activity is 40 percent, and the likelihood of greater than a 10 percent
reduction is less than 1 percent. The likelihood that a high volume of
employer campaign activity will reduce the likelihood of a union vote is
greater, with a 91 percent probability of more than a 5 percent reduction,
and a 64 percent probability of more than a 10 percent reduction. Thus,
even if Dickens' reanalysis is accepted, it provides no support whatsoever
for continued Board regulation, as there is little sense in incurring the
costs of such regulation in order to have the Board ferret out illegal tac-
tics that, by Dickens' calculation, matter far less than the volume and
timing of employer campaigning, matters over which the Board has no
control whatsoever.37
35 Weiler, Promises, supra note 6, at 1784.
36 Dickens, Company Campaigns, supra note 22, at 566.
37 In LAW AND REALrrY, supra note 1, at 107-08, we suggested that the fact that the employer
conducted a campaign, without regard to the specific content of that campaign, or its legality, might
have an effect on employee voting behavior. That suggestion is wholly consistent with Dickens'
conclusion that the volume and timing of the employer campaign matter more than its legality or
illegality.
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Professor Weiler next relies on Dickens' computer simulation of
elections, reproduced below, to argue that "the raw data that Getman
and his coauthors so carefully gathered point to precisely the opposite
conclusion from the one they drew."
'38
TABLE VIII.239
SIMULATED EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNS ON ELECTION
OUTCOMES IN PERCENTAGES OF 3,100
SIMULATED ELECTIONS WON BY THE
UNION
TYPE OF CAMPAIGN
() (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Specification: Actual All No No Intense Intense Light Legal
Campaign Violations Violations Company Company Legal Campaign
Committed Committed Campaign Campaign Campaign in every
in every in any case in any case in every in every case
case case* case**
N.L.R.B.
Remedy 36% 25% 44% 66% 5% 9% 58%
Specific
Violations 36% 17% 47% 67% 4% 22% 63%
* All violations committed in every case.
** No violations committed in any case.
We doubt that any conclusions can be drawn from Dickens' simulation
data. First, the simulation rests on the assumptions of Dickens' original
model, including the assumption that company campaign activities are
unrelated to union campaign activities. Second, the results of Dickens'
simulation cast substantial doubt upon its reliability. For example, if one
compares, in the NLRB remedy row, column 2 (all violations-original
level of campaigning) 4° with column 3 (no violations-original level of
campaigning), illegal campaigning appears to reduce the union's likeli-
hood of winning an election from 44 percent to 25 percent.4' However, if
one next compares column 2 (all violations--original level of campaign-
ing) with column 6 (no violations-increased level of campaigning), one
finds that the absence of violations, coupled with an increase in the level
of campaigning reduced the likelihood of a union victory from 25 percent
to 9 percent. This suggests that it is not illegal campaigning that hurts
38 Weiler, Promises, supra note 6, at 1786.
39 See Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 104.
40 Dickens' measure of the intensity of campaigning in this table is the same as in Table VII.3,
see supra text accompanying note 33,-the volume of written communications, meetings, and super-
visory conversations with employees. Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 106-07.
41 All comparisons are to data in the NLRB remedy specification, rather than the specific viola-
tion specification. See supra note 33. While the proportion of union victories differs slightly accord-
ing to the specification, the only substantial difference is in column 6. Dickens attributes this
difference to "either the lack of acuity in NLRB rulings, or of specification error that is influencing
the measurement of the effects of the specific violations." Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 106.
79:721 (1984)
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the union, but a high volume of campaigning. Similarly, if one compares
column 2 (all violations-original level of campaigning) with column 5
(all violations-increased level of campaigning), it appears that keeping
the violation level constant, while increasing the amount of campaigning,
reduced the union's prospects of victory from 25 percent to 4 percent.
This, too, suggests that it is the level of employer campaigning, not its
characterization as legal or illegal, that affects the union's chances of
victory.
In sum, either Dickens' simulation data are too unreliable to be of
value, or they lead to the same conclusion as does his Table VII.3-that
it is the volume of employer campaigning that influences the union's
prospects of victory, not whether that campaigning is legal or illegal.
Whichever conclusion one draws, Dickens' simulation data do not un-
dercut our conclusion that illegal campaigning has no greater effect on
vote than does legal campaigning, or our recommendation that Board
regulation, which exists for the purpose of separating legal from illegal
campaigning, should be abandoned.42
It is also of interest in assessing the validity of both the Weiler criti-
cisms and the Dickens' reanalysis that the only major empirical study
conducted since Law and Reality reaches the same conclusions that we
did regarding the effect of unlawful campaigning. 43 Professor Laura
Cooper obtained access to NLRB files on all elections conducted by one
regional office during 1978, 1979, and 1980-a total of 760 elections. 4
For each election NLRB files showed, inter alia, the number of authori-
zation cards submitted by the union, whether unfair labor practices were
found, and the results of the election.45 Analyzing these data, Cooper
found: (1) no evidence that unions lost a significantly higher proportion
of elections when employers committed unfair labor practices than when
they did not, regardless of the size of the unit;46 (2) no evidence that
union support declined more between the signing of authorization cards
and the election when employers committed unfair labor practices than
when they did not, regardless of whether the election outcome was
42 See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 139-53. The union victory percentage ranges that
Weiler reports, see Weiler, supra note 6, at 1786, are not found in the simulation table reproduced
here. That is because the table reproduced here provides point estimates of the effect of different
campaign practices under both the NLRB remedy and specific violations specifications, while Dick-
ens' Table 3, on which Weiler relies, reports confidence intervals of the effect of different campaign
practices for the specific violations specification only. Dickens thesis, supra note 22, at 108. The two
tables differ not at all in the comparative proportion of union victories under each of the seven
campaign categories.
43 Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical As-
sessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 87
(1984).
44 Id. at 106-09. Actually, there were 791 elections, but 31 multi-union elections were omitted
for purposes of analysis.
45 Id. at 105-08.
46 Ird. at 114-16.
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close.4 7 While her study is not without its limits, 4 8 it nonetheless stands
as important empirical support for the conclusions reached in Law and
Reality. Indeed, Cooper states that her results "substantially replicate
the conclusions of the Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study of election
behavior." 49
IV. CONCLUSION
For the past fifty years, the Labor Board has tried to protect em-
ployee freedom of choice by limiting what employers may say and do.
Its basic theory, supported by Weiler, is that employee vote is vulnerable
to manipulation through suggestions of employer reprisals and that em-
ployees, because they are economically dependent upon the employer,
are likely to apprehend suggestions of coercion in ambiguous employer
statements. 50
It is our conclusion that a policy which seeks to neutralize employer
economic power through limitation of communication is basically mis-
guided. There are several reasons why this is so. First, Board regulation
is directed to the election and to limiting employer references to its eco-
nomic power during the pre-election campaign period. Employees, how-
ever, do not learn of the employer's economic power or consider the
possibility of reprisal for the first time during this period. To the con-
trary, our data suggest that fear of reprisal has its greatest impact in
discouraging employees from seriously considering unionizing prior to
the period of the regulated campaign. They know that many employers
have resorted to economic reprisals to prevent unionization. Rather than
risk such reprisals, many of them decide, as soon as they learn of the
union organizing drive, to have nothing to do with the union.
Furthermore, to the extent that employees are susceptible to manip-
ulation or coercion during the campaign based on fear of economic repri-
sal, there is no difference in impact between that employer speech which
is permitted and that which is prohibited. The first amendment and sec-
tion 8(c) require that an employer be able to state the case against unioni-
zation.51 The typical professionally developed employer campaign
47 Id. at 115, 117.
48 For example, she points out that more authorization cards might have been signed than were
turned in to the Board, id. at 107, and that unfair labor practices might have occurred in some
elections where no charges were filed. Id. at 113-114. Either of these factors would lead to underes-
timating the effects of unfair labor practices.
49 Id. at 140.
50 The vast majority of unlawful statements are not direct threats. For tactical reasons, those
who seek to utilize fear seek to convince employees that it is the advent of the union, not the malevo-
lence of the employer, which is the primary danger.
51 "The expressing of any views or argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether
in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of the violation of the
provisions of this subchapter, if such expressions contain no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." Labor Management Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
79:721 (1984)
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involves an effort to suggest harmful consequences without detailing pre-
cisely how they will come about. Our data show that the extent to which
these statements will be perceived as threats of retaliation depends upon
the employees' attitudes and fears, and not upon the specific content of
what is said. To those predisposed to perceive threats, a perfectly lawful
campaign will be full of efforts to frighten and coerce. To those predis-
posed to see the employer in a benevolent light, even speeches containing
direct threats will be transformed into statements supportive of free
choice.
The fact that perceptions of threat do not vary with Board doctrine
is not surprising. The fact is that employees do not parse employer docu-
ments like literary critics. Indeed, rarely do they focus on their explicit
content. Thus, for groups of employees susceptible to coercion, Board
regulation of the content of the campaign is meaningless. Some are in-
timidated before the campaign even begins; others are susceptible to in-
timidation by campaign propaganda that the Board, constrained by
section 8(c) and the dictates of the first amendment, cannot prohibit.
Finally, one result of the current policy of regulating the content of
employer speech is that it weakens the argument in favor of allowing
unions the opportunity to respond to such speech. As noted earlier, the
Board and the courts hardly ever find that a sufficient imbalance in op-
portunities for organizational communication exists that would permit
union access to company premises and the opportunity to respond to
employer speech. Yet our data suggest that the union disadvantage in
communicating with employees is considerably more of an impediment
to the exercise of employee free choice than is the content of the em-
ployer campaign. To remedy that disadvantage, shown by Law and Re-
ality to be caused primarily by the employer's ability to campaign against
union representation on working time and premises, the union should be
allowed the opportunity to engage in such campaigning whenever the
employer does S0.52 Apart from a gain in the union's ability to make its
52 Some critics of LAW AND REALITY, albeit not Weiler, have criticized this recommendation on
the ground that we found campaign familiarity not to affect voting behavior. These critics assert
that if this is so, whatever communications advantage the employer may have is irrelevant, and does
not justify a recommendation aimed at increasing employees' familiarity with the union campaign.
See, eg., Miller, The Getman, Goldberg and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1171-72
(1976).
One response to this criticism is that it overstates our data on lack of campaign effect. While
there was no evidence that attendance at company meetings or familiarity with the content of the
company campaign were associated with switching to the company, there was evidence that attend-
ance at union meetings and familiarity with the union campaign were associated with switching to
the union. There was also evidence that those employees who attended union meetings were typi-
cally committed to the union. Hence, the data do justify recommending union access to employees
who might vote either company or union, and for whom increased knowledge of the union might be
crucial.
Additionally, increased union access to employees must be seen as one element in our total
package of recommendations. Our proposal that government regulation of speech be terminated
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case, such a rule might well have a profound symbolic role in lessening
the sense of the employer's absolute power-a crucial element of
coercion.
rests, in part, on the expectation that each party will be able to point out to the voters those aspects
of the other party's campaign it believes to be untruthful or unfair. Unions will have that ability
only if they have the opportunity to communicate on equal terms with the employer. See Goldberg,
Getman & Brett, Union Representation Elections Law and Reality: The Authors Respond To The
Critics, 79 MicH. L. Rnv. 564, 591-93 (1981); LAw AND REALrry, supra note 1, at 90-93, 95-96,
103-07, 156-59.
79:721 (1984)
HeinOnline  -- 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735 1984-1985
